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I. Introduction
In 1983, the American Bar Association reframed the ethical
rules for the practice of law and created the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.1 Eventually, all fifty states and the District
of Columbia adopted their own version of the Model Rules.2 With
few jurisdictional exceptions, ethical guidelines adopted in the
United States restrict lawyers from sharing legal fees with
non-lawyers.3 Additionally, the Model Rules prohibit a lawyer from

1. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT’S GUIDE 6 (2013–2014) (setting out a brief history of
rules of professional conduct in the legal profession).
2. See id. at 7–8 (offering the scope of adoption of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct).
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(generalizing a restriction incorporated into the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct).
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allowing a third party to “direct or regulate the lawyer’s
professional judgment . . . .”4
While drafting the Model Rules, the American Bar
Association’s Commission on the Evaluation of Professional
Standards proposed allowing non-lawyer ownership, non-lawyer
investment, and non-lawyer management of a law firm.5
Opponents of expanding law firm ownership to non-lawyers voiced
immediate concern that traditional law firms would be unable to
compete with aggressive corporate models and that economic
pressures would erode the professional independence of lawyers.6
Although arguments for supporting the status quo in the United
States prevailed, other countries with common law traditions have
since permitted alternative business structures that allow
non-lawyer ownership and management of law firms.7
Whether alternative business structures might improve access
to justice for low- to moderate-income clients remains a
contentious matter.8 Because alternative business structures are
generally unavailable, lawyers rely on 501(c)(3) non-profit status
and sliding-scale fee structures to reach an underserved market of
low-to moderate-income clientele.9 Nevertheless, use of a
sliding-scale fee structure is rare—perhaps because it fails to
maximize law firm profits.10 A sliding-scale fee structure also does
4. Id. at cmt. 2.
5. See Tyler Cobb, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too! Appropriately
Harnessing the Advantages of Nonlawyer Ownership, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 765, 770
(2012) (observing an option considered by the ABA, but later rejected).
6. See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big
Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1,
10–11 (1998) (recognizing strong opposition to the expansion of law firm
ownership to nonlawyer entities).
7. See Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer
Ownership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5 (2016)
(suggesting that analyzing alternative paths in other countries may prove
beneficial).
8. See, e.g., Bailey Cunningham, Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms: A
Recurring Debate, 104 ILL. B.J. 48 (2016).) (“Nonlawyer ownership, aka
‘alternative business structures’ threatens the professional independence of
lawyers, and the ethics rules forbidding it should not be changed.”).
9. See, e.g., OPEN LEGAL SERV., https://openlegalservices.org/ (last visited
Feb. 4, 2019) (demonstrating a firm utilizing both non-profit status and
sliding- scale fee structure) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
10. See Michael Zuckerman, The Utah Lawyers Who Are Making Legal
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not assist clients who need legal services, but do not qualify for
LSC-funded programs and are unable to pay even a portion of
subsidized legal fees.11 This Note addresses why using a non-profit
model to provide legal services to low- to moderate-income clientele
is necessarily self-limiting. This Note further suggests that
alternative business structures permitting non-lawyer ownership
and operation of law firms are a more effective and efficient means
to reach a presently underserved market.
Part II provides a background about Model Rule 5.4 and
discusses theories and rationales for why the legal profession in
the United States refuses to compromise on deeply entrenched
biases against nonlawyer ownership or management of law firms.
Part III considers the methods and structures of non-profit law
firms currently serving low- to moderate-income clientele and
highlights specific examples of similarities and distinctions
between varying legal markets. Part IV offers reasons why serving
moderate-income clientele through a non-profit model is a
self-limiting and ultimately inadequate way of expanding access to
justice for a presently underserved market. Finally, Part V
advocates permitting non-lawyer ownership and management of
law firms. By utilizing business-sector expertise and economies of
scale, lawyers can improve access to justice for low- to
moderate-income clientele. This Note identifies Wills as a specific
practice area already making such a transition.
II. Background
A. Origin and Evolution of Model Rule 5.4
In 1964, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association created the Special Committee on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards.12 The committee developed the Model Code of
Services
Affordable,
ATLANTIC
(Aug.
7,
2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/08/the-utah-lawyers-whoare-making-legal-services-affordable/375717/?single_page=true (“Part of the
reason is that it doesn’t maximize profits—you can’t get rich running it.”) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
11. See id. (illustrating how non-profit models address access to legal
services).
12. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, ix (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980)
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Professional Responsibility based on the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.13 The ABA adopted the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1969.14 By 1977, the legal profession
recognized growing pressure to reconsider priorities inherently
promoted by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.15
Highly publicized lawyer conduct during the Watergate scandal
compounded the pressure for reform by further shifting public
sentiment toward the belief that the legal profession was openly
self-serving.16 One specific critique of the legal profession focused
on tasks nonlawyers could adequately perform, but were prevented
from performing, because of a prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law.17
The prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law was
among the issues that prompted the ABA to form the Kutak
Commission in 1977.18 The purpose of the Kutak Commission was
“to reinforce the idea that lawyers served the public good, and
helped improve American social, economic, and political
structures.”19 The Kutak Commission went further than simply
amending the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, and
concluded “a comprehensive reformulation was required.”20 In
(giving background on establishing the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility).
13. See id. (explaining how the Canons of Professional Ethics were based
principally on the Code of Ethics adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association
in 1887).
14. See id. (stating further that the MCPR went into effect on January 1,
1970).
15. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 704 (1977) (“[L]awyers' ethics are
consistently self-serving and . . . pressure for revision of several basic concepts of
professional responsibility is both sound and inevitable.”).
16. See Michael Ariens, The Last Hurrah: The Kutak Commission and the
End of Optimism, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 689, 699 (2016) (“By 1977, the ABA had
worked for over a decade to show that its principal effort was service to the public,
not mere self-interest.”).
17. See Morgan, supra note 15, at 708 (“[T]he important question is not
whether lawyers have something to contribute, but, rather, what justification
there is for wholly excluding the alternative services which could be provided
by nonlawyers.”).
18. See Ariens, supra note 16, at 702–03 (listing the basic precepts of the
Kutak Commission).
19. Id. at 699.
20. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, ABA
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spite of recognizing the need to evolve, the legal profession reacted
negatively toward change.21 As part of this reaction, the ABA
ultimately rejected a proposal to allow non-lawyer ownership of
law firms, and non-lawyer business partnerships with lawyers.22
A rule against fee-sharing and partnerships between lawyers
and non-lawyers was originally incorporated into the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility on the premise of preserving the
professional independence of lawyers.23 The Kutak Commission
recognized revising such a rule would permit development of
nontraditional forms of organizing a law practice.24 The
Commission acknowledged contemporary rules restricting the
unauthorized practice of law were not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to prevent an undermining of the legal profession, but
instead focused on the particular form a law firm could take.25
During its consideration of partnerships between lawyers and
non-lawyers, the Commission was aware the legal profession
needed to expand access to legal services.26

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at *4 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft
1980) (describing the extent of the Commission’s objective in producing the
Discussion Draft).
21. See Ariens, supra note 16, at 711 (addressing the ABA’s rejection of the
Commission’s departure from “the traditional framework and substantive content
of the Code”).
22. See Matthew W. Bish, Revising Model Rule 5.4: Adopting a Regulatory
Scheme the Permits Nonlawyer Ownership and Management of Law Firms, 48
WASHBURN L.J. 669, 670 (2009) (considering an alternative to the current rule
captured in Model Rule 5.4).
23. See id. at 674 (inferring the ABA intended the structure of the Model
Rules DR 3-102 and DR 3-103 to restrict the unauthorized practice of law).
24. See ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (AM.
BAR
ASS’N,
Report
400
to
the
House
of
Delegates
1982),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_resp
onsibility/kutak_8-82.pdf (explaining the need for expanding the means of
making legal services more available) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
25. See id. (“The Commission believes the Rules in this area should focus on
the actual potential for abuse in such developments rather than the particular
form of law practice.”).
26. See id. (“[T]here is a demonstrable need for expansion of the means of
making legal services more available.”).
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B. Arguments Against Nonlawyer Ownership or
Management `of a Law Firm
The legal profession in the United States has long considered
itself something more than a business.27 In 1909, the Court of
Appeals of New York decided the case of Matter of Co-operative
Law Co.28 In that case, a law firm organized as a corporation under
a state Business Corporations Law.29 The firm operated until 1909
when the legislature passed a statute criminalizing the practice of
law by a corporation.30 During its analysis, the court stated:
The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant
in a limited and dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust
and confidence. It cannot be delegated without consent and it
cannot exist between an attorney employed by a corporation to
practice law for it, and a client of the corporation, for he would
be subject to the directions of the corporation and not to the
directions of the client . . . . The corporation would control the
litigation, the money earned would belong to the corporation
and the attorney would be responsible to the corporation only.31

The court went on to conclude the law firm could never have been
a corporation within any meaning contemplated by the Business
Corporations Law, and therefore the business did not lawfully
exist.32
There are three potential arguments against allowing
non-lawyer ownership or management of a law firm. The first is
that non-lawyer ownership or partnership of a firm poses a risk to
professional independence. The second argument is that
non-lawyer ownership or management heightens the possibility for
27. See Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483 (1910) (“The
practice of law is not a business open to all, but a personal right, limited to a few
persons of good moral character, with special qualifications ascertained and
certified after a long course of study . . . .”).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 481 (explaining the facts of the case as recited by the New York
Court of Appeals).
31. Id. at 483–84.
32. See id. at 484–85 (reasoning that business ownership of a law firm was
not meant as an objective of the legislature because “[s]uch an innovation with
the evil results that might follow would require the use of specific language clearly
indicating the intention”).
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a breach of lawyer/client confidentiality. The final argument stems
from fear and uncertainty about how the current business model
for many law firms would be destabilized by entry into the legal
marketplace of large, corporate business structures.
1. Professional Independence
A business model where a non-lawyer operates or manages a
law firm may raise concerns about professional independence.
Professional independence is thought of in two ways.33 First,
professional independence may refer to independence from clients,
whereby a lawyer pursues honesty with the client with regard to
the client’s preferred course of conduct.34 Second—and pertinent to
non-lawyer ownership or management of law firms—professional
independence may refer to independence from third parties whose
interests could compromise a lawyer’s professional duty to the
client or the public.35
Professional independence from third parties is theoretically
protected by a restriction against sharing legal fees with
non-lawyers, and a prohibition against practicing law
in corporations or associations with non-lawyers.36 Without such a
restriction a lawyer might assign his or her loyalty to “the one who
holds the purse strings,” rather than to the client who has
entrusted the lawyer with legal representation.37 The potential
threat lies where lawyers would be paid to attain business goals,
resulting in a strong incentive to sacrifice client interests and the
integrity of the legal system as a whole.38
33. See Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ Professional Independence: Overrated or
Undervalued?, 46 AKRON L. REV. 599, 607–08 (2013) (offering two distinct ways
to look at “professional independence”).
34. See id. at 608–09 (distinguishing between independence from the client
and independence from third parties).
35. Id. at 613.
36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(“The provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These
limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment.”).
37. See Jack F. Dunbar, Multidisciplinary Practice Translated Means “Let’s
Kill All the Lawyers”, 79 MICH. B.J. 64, 66 (2000) (acknowledging concern that
client interests would not be controlling over a lawyer’s personal economic
interests).
38. See id. at 67 (arguing that economic power in the hands of nonlawyers
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2. Breach of Lawyer/Client Confidentiality
A business model where a non-lawyer operates or manages a
law firm raises concerns about lawyer/client confidentiality. A
lawyer is not permitted to share information about the
representation of a client except in extremely limited
circumstances.39 The purpose of confidentiality between a client
and a lawyer is to enable trust within the relationship.40 Trust
encourages a client to communicate candidly, and open
communication is essential for a lawyer to effectuate adequate
representation.41
If a lawyer practices under an organization managed or owned
by a nonlawyer, client information might become accessible to a
non-lawyer, and thus not subject to the same legal protections of
lawyer/client confidentiality.42 Various segments of a business
with access to client information might even expose otherwise
privileged client communications to discovery or public intrusion.43
Vicarious non-lawyer access to client information presents a risk
to the legal profession that would obligate nonlawyers to adhere to
the same standards as lawyers with respect to conflicts of
interest.44 A non-lawyer’s obligation to client confidences would
become increasingly difficult to keep as a business grows across
intersections of geography, client base, and practice areas.45

shifts the goals of the profession into the economic realm, rather than centering
considerations on professional ethics).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
40. See id. at cmt. 2 (positing that trust is “the hallmark” of the client-lawyer
relationship).
41. See id. (“The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally
damaging subject matter.”).
42. See J. Nick Badgerow, A Profession on the Threshold: The Bar Considers
Multiple Discipline Practices, 69 J. KAN. B.A. 12, 15 (2000) (suggesting lawyers
would need to warn clients that information disclosed to a nonlawyer within the
business would probably not be confidential).
43. See id. at 15–16 (highlighting a potential alteration in expectations a
client might have about client-lawyer confidentiality).
44. See id. at 16 (raising the additional context of conflicts of interest under
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 and 1.9).
45. See id. at 15–16 (suggesting that as client bases grow, conflicts between
branches of the same business would become subject to confusion).
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3. Destabilization of Legal Monopoly

A business model where a non-lawyer operates or manages a
law firm raises concerns about the security of the monopoly
lawyers possess over the practice of law. The Kutak Commission’s
effort to alter Model Rule 5.4 to allow non-lawyer ownership of a
law firm was defeated, at least in part, because of the “Fear of
Sears.”46 The Fear of Sears was the belief that if large corporations
could own law firms, small firms would be unable to compete in the
legal marketplace.47 While protection of a monopoly on the legal
services is framed as an interest in maintaining professionalism,
the subtext of maintaining professional independence is often
interpreted as a long-enduring interest to secure business for
lawyers.48
A monopoly on the practice of law might be worth maintaining
if there was an imminent threat of harm presented by any
non-lawyer that provided any legal services.49 To be sure,
protecting the public from incompetent and unethical legal
services is well within the scope of legitimate interests to the bar.50
But mere qualification as a lawyer is logically insufficient to
ensure the provision of adequate legal representation to clients.51
An absolutist approach precluding all non-lawyer representation
or business contact with the legal profession in all circumstances

46. See Cobb, supra note 5, at 771 (describing a basis for rejecting non-lawyer
ownership of law firms).
47. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 10 (describing the grounds for
opposing the Kutak Commission’s version of Rule 5.4).
48. See James W. Jones, Getting at the Root of Core Values: A “Radical”
Proposal to Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 1159, 1171 (2000) (giving a history of self-protectionism in the legal
profession).
49. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 230 (1990) (“[T]he traditional rationale for
unauthorized practice constraints—protection of the public from incompetent and
unethical services—cannot support the current prohibitions. Although the risk to
consumers should not be overlooked, it has been too often overstated.”).
50. See id. (acknowledging that the restriction against unauthorized practice
has some merit).
51. See id. (challenging the notion that an inexperienced attorney is more
advantageous to a client than an experienced legal technician).
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fails to consider alternatives that might, on balance, benefit the
public interest at no significant risk of harm to clients.52
C. Alternative Business Structures Abroad
1. United Kingdom
Although arguments against non-lawyer ownership or
management of law firms persist in the United States, other
countries with common law traditions have approached the issue
with more flexibility. The United Kingdom liberalized rules on the
ownership of law firms through the Legal Services Act of 2007.53
The Legal Services Act permits lawyers to form alternative
business structures.54 The scope of the Act allowed alternative
business structures to include non-lawyer ownership interest in a
firm.55 The direct impact of the Legal Services Act on low- to
moderate-income clientele is difficult to gauge because of other
governmental policy choices that immediately followed the Act.56
Subsequent data gathering shows that the segment of the legal
market most immediately impacted by the Legal Services Act has
been personal injury claims.57
A notable structural model emerging from the Legal Services
Act in the United Kingdom was Co-Operative Legal Services,
which operated under the umbrella of the Co-Operative Group.58
52. See id. at 231 (rejecting the limiting choice that comes with prohibiting
the practice of law by all non-lawyers).
53. See Barron Dickinson, Non-Lawyer Ownership of Law Firms in Florida:
Issues with Corporate Governance, 16 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 99, 117 (2017)
(providing a global context for how professionalism and professional
independence is evolving in other countries).
54. See Michele DeStafano, Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the
Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2817 (2012) (explaining the
scope of the Legal Services Act).
55. See Dickinson, supra note 53, at 117–18 (describing factors considered to
allow nonlawyer investment in a law firm).
56. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 19–21 (recognizing that the impact of the
Legal Services Act relies on extraneous economic and policy circumstances).
57. See id. at 21 (tempering optimism alternative business structures
improve access to moderate-income clientele).
58. See id. at 26 (describing an alternative business structure aimed at
providing services to moderate-income clientele).
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The Co-Operative Group has existed in the United Kingdom in
some form since 1844, and is owned by independent consumers.59
The Co-Op model is engaged in numerous areas of commerce,
including as a food retailer, a funeral services provider, and a
general insurer.60 The stated objective of the Co-Operative’s
expansion into legal services was to expand the entire market for
legal services.61
These new alternatives business structures, however, have
not been without their share of trouble. For example, despite
operating as one of the largest providers of legal services to
moderate-income clients in the key area of family law, Co-Op Legal
Services “has not been able to halt a massive increase in the
number of unrepresented litigants in UK family courts . . . .”62
Furthermore, Co-Operative Legal Services also endured
challenges to its brand connected to management issues and
financial problems in other sectors of its broader corporate
structure.63 With only a few years of practice in a new form of
non-lawyer-controlled business structure, it is perhaps too early to
determine whether the alternative business structures permitted
by the Legal Services Act will broaden access to the legal services
market for low- to moderate-income clients in the United
Kingdom.64

59. See Co-op History, CO-OP, https://www.co-operative.coop/aboutus/history (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (giving a brief history of the organization
and its structure) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
60. Id.
61. See Liberalizing the Law: Supermarket Sweep, ECONOMIST (Apr. 27,
2013),
https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21576675-cold-windcompetition-sweeps-legal-services-market-supermarket-sweep
(evaluating
change in the legal market caused by activities of the Co-operative Group) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
62. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 27 (noting a steep increase in
unrepresented litigants resulting from legal aid cuts that took place in 2013).
63. See Judith A. McMorrow, UK Alternative Business Structures for Legal
Practice: Emerging Models and Lessons for the U.S., 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 665, 694–
95 (2016) (describing challenges to Co-Operative Legal Services).
64. See id. at 694 (noting that “the ABS structure allowed the legal unit to
weather a rough business year. Had it been a traditional law firm, without outside
[financial] support, [Co-Op Legal Services] presumably would have closed.”).
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2. Australia

Australia is another common law country that legislatively
expanded non-lawyer ownership or management of law firms.65
The Legal Profession (Incorporated Legal Practices) Act 2000
widely opened the door for legal service providers in New South
Wales to register as companies with the Australian federal
corporations agency.66 The Act evolved to include more opportunity
for non-lawyer influence and investment in law firms across
Australia.67
The result of permitting unlimited non-lawyer investment in
Australia has been different than the result of similar legislative
choices in the United Kingdom.68 Motivation to incorporate law
firms in Australia is possibly driven more by tax benefits than the
goal of restructuring firms into large-scale, corporate models.69
Additionally, law firm incorporation in Australia does not
necessarily lead to non-lawyer ownership or management.70
Supporters of the Act argue that investment capital drives law
firm growth, which in turn helps large law firms attain economies
of scale to engage in more public-oriented or pro bono
representation.71 A prominent example of a public-oriented,
65. See Dickinson, supra note 53, at 121 (describing Australia’s embrace of
alternative law firm business structures).
66. See Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices—A
New Era in the Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 671, 674 (2004) (providing background for the development
of alternative business structures in Australia).
67. See id. at 688 n.41 (“The Attorneys General of all other Australian states
have agreed to enact legislation over the next year or so to allow for the
incorporation of legal practices.”).
68. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 29 (recognizing differences between
impacts in the United Kingdom and Australia with respect to enactment of
similar legislation).
69. See CHRISTINE PARKER, PEERING OVER THE ETHICAL PRECIPICE:
INCORPORATION, LISTING, AND THE ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAW FIRMS 12
(Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1132926 (arguing that Australian law firms are
motivated to incorporate primarily for a beneficial tax rate) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
70. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 30 (“[Incorporated legal
practices] . . . have become quite common . . . but actual outside ownership . . . is
still rare.”).
71. See Benedict Sheehy, From Law Firm to Stock Exchange Listed Law
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not-for-profit firm in Australia is Salvos Legal, which is wholly
owned by The Salvation Army.72 Salvos Legal operates in areas
such as corporate, commercial, property, and intellectual
property.73 Salvos Legal reinvests all of its profits to another
division operated as Salvos Legal Humanitarian.74 Salvos Legal
Humanitarian provides free legal services for indigent clients
across Australia.75 Salvos Legal Humanitarian claims to assist
hundreds of indigent clients each week, utilizing donations and
pro-bono volunteers in addition to profits from Salvos Legal.76
Opponents of the Act argue its benefits may be unrealized
because large law firms beholden to investors will not engage in
risky or publicly-oriented litigation unless ensured such litigation
will return a profit or build the company brand.77 But whether
incorporation of law firms and non-lawyer investment encourages
a more publicly-oriented legal market or simply consolidates the
legal market in a way that ultimately results in a corporate legal
monopoly is unanswered.78

Practice: An Examination of Institutional and Regulatory Reform, 20 INTL. J.
LEGAL PROF. 3, 24 (2013) (arguing that incorporated legal practices have not
significantly affected the administration of justice, but have contributed to
corporate governance).
72. See Our Story, SALVOS LEGAL, https://www.salvoslegal.com.au/our-story/
(last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (explaining the corporate structure of Salvos Legal)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
73. See id. (listing the firm’s various service areas).
74. See id. (“[W]e are a social enterprise law firm—all of our profits are used
to fund Salvos Legal Humanitarian, our humanitarian arm which operates free
legal services for people in need in NSW, Queensland[,] and Victoria.”).
75. See id.; Humanitarian Free Legal Service, SALVOS LEGAL,
https://www.salvoslegal.com.au/expertise/humanitarian-free-legal-service/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2019) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
76. See SALVOS LEGAL, supra note 72 (“We provide free legal services to
hundreds of clients every week across our sixteen offices.”).
77. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 33 (considering statements that firms with
non-lawyer investors must meet expectations set out in market forecasts, and
that controversial pro bono work is not oriented to such requirements).
78. See id. (restating arguments against reforms in Australia to expand
non-lawyer investment in law firms).
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D. The District of Columbia.
To a lesser degree than seen in common law countries outside
the United States, the District of Columbia has a more open
posture toward non-lawyer ownership and management of law
firms. The District of Columbia remains an outlier in the United
States with respect to Model Rule 5.4, becoming the first
jurisdiction to allow non-lawyers to become partners in law firms.79
Rule 5.4 of the Rules Governing the District of Columbia Bar
provides:
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of
organization in which a financial interest is held or managerial
authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs
professional services which assist the organization in providing
legal services to clients, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose
providing legal services to clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a
financial interest undertake to abide by these Rules of
Professional Conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial
authority in the partnership or organization undertake to be
responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent
as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.80

Perhaps the District of Columbia adopted a varied version of Rule
5.4 because of the unique networking opportunities available
within the political culture of the District.81 More so than in most
U.S. cities, law firms in the District of Columbia stand to benefit
substantially from hiring former non-lawyer government officials

79. See Justin Schiff, The Changing Nature of the Law Firm: Amending
Model Rule 5.4 to Allow for Alternative Business Structures Resulting in
Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms, 42 CAP. U.L. REV. 1009, 1019 (2014) (noting
the unique allowance of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct).
80. D.C. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT r. 5.4 (2017).
81. See Victoria S. Sahani, Reshaping Third Party Funding, 91 TUL. L. REV.
405, 458–59 (2017) (describing the specific circumstances warranting relaxation
of Model Rule 5.4 within the District of Columbia).
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into their organization and then leveraging the interpersonal
connections of those officials to generate business.82
Although the liberalization of Model Rule 5.4 in the District of
Columbia represents a departure from the ABA Model Code, the
change is modest.83 Subsection (b)(1) provides that every
partnership or organization with a non-lawyer investor must have
as its sole purpose the provision of legal services.84 The narrow
scope of the rule also limits the number of law firms that take
advantage of the rule to those operating exclusively within the
District of Columbia.85 Because the District of Colombia is the only
jurisdiction where non-lawyer ownership is permitted,
multi-district firms operating in D.C. cannot adopt a structure that
could lead to rules violations in other jurisdictions.86 Unless
further action is taken to reduce uncertainty about a firm’s ability
to engage in fee-sharing with offices outside the District, the
potential for experimentation with non-lawyer ownership inside
the District will be restrained.87
III. Current Nonprofit Structures
A. Process for Obtaining 501(c)(3) Status
Restrictions on business structures that integrate legal
services with non-ownership or management may affect access to
legal services for less privileged socio-economic groups. In
response, some lawyers have created nonprofit organizations that
82. See id. at 459 (explaining how unique opportunities have flourished in
the District of Columbia under the relaxed rule).
83. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice
and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery
of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 98 n.78
(2000) (highlighting the inherent limitations of the District of Columbia rule).
84. See id. (recognizing the textual boundaries of the rule).
85. See Cobb, supra note 5, at 783–84 (suggesting that the rule has a limited
impact because it does not invite investment by non-lawyers into firms that
operate outside of the District of Columbia).
86. See id. at 783–85 (suggesting a reason why more firms in the District of
Columbia have not experimented with non-lawyer owners).
87. See id. at 785–86 (arguing that fully understanding whether non-lawyer
ownership is beneficial or harmful to the legal profession requires additional steps
yet to be taken).
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attempt to offer legal services to underserved moderate- and
low-income clientele.88 Both public interest law firms and legal aid
organizations are eligible to qualify for nonprofit, tax-exempt
status as charitable organizations under 26 U.S.C. § 501, I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3).89 However, public interest law firms and legal aid
organizations are not functionally identical. A public interest law
firm must serve a broad community interest.90 In contrast, a legal
aid organization represents indigent clients in matters specific to
the interests of those individual clients.91 A legal aid organization
may charge clients for legal services and still remain qualified for
tax-exempt status as long as fees are adjusted according to a
client’s ability to pay, and not according to the type of service
rendered.92
Regardless of prospective clientele, starting a nonprofit law
firm first requires compliance with registration rules set out by the
state bar in the state or states where the firm intends to practice.93
Properly registering for 501(c)(3) status comes with separate
requirements, and ultimately creates additional hurdles for a
nonprofit firm seeking to expand legal services to moderate-income
clients. The process required by state of Virginia is offered below
as an example.
1. Process for State Incorporation for a Nonprofit Law Firm
Some states draw a distinction between legal aid
organizations and nonprofit law firms. In Virginia, a legal aid
88. See Mitch, Tipping the Scales of Justice: The Role of the Nonprofit Sliding
Scale Law Firm in the Delivery of Legal Services, 20 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
375, 378–79 (2017) (describing a brief history of recognition by the legal profession
that low- and moderate-income clients have difficulty accessing legal
representation).
89. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).
90. See Mitch, supra note 88, at 380 (explaining the difference between
public interest law firms and legal aid organizations, according to Rev. Rul. 75-74,
1975-1 C.B. 662).
91. See id. at 381 (focusing on how a legal aid organization may be postured
with respect to indigent clients of various means).
92. See Rev. Rul. 78-428, 1978-2 C.B. 177 (explaining the substantial
economic relief provided to the poor and distressed allowed by charging adjusted
fees contingent upon client income).
93. See, e.g., Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Pt. 6 § 4 para. 14 (2018).
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organization must first qualify as a tax-exempt entity under
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.94 The primary purpose of
a legal aid organization is to provide free legal assistance to those
who cannot pay.95 Beyond expenses and costs, a legal aid
organization is strictly prohibited from collecting a fee for legal
services.96 The Legal Services Corporation of Virginia provides
substantial grants to legal aid organizations offering direct legal
assistance to clients who live at or near the poverty level.97
However, a nonprofit law firm that collects any fees from low- to
moderate-income clients is not considered a legal aid organization,
and thus cannot receive grant support from the Legal Services
Corporation of Virginia.
The first step toward forming a nonprofit law firm that may
collect fees is to confirm Virginia State Bar approval for the name
of the firm in accordance with Virginia Rule of Professional
Conduct 7.1.98 Upon name approval, formation of a nonprofit
corporation in Virginia requires filing with the State Corporation
Commission.99 Form SCC819 identifies an entity as a Virginia
Nonstock Corporation.100 Under Section 13.1-814 of the Code of
Virginia, a Nonstock Corporation does not have owners, and
distributions to members are restricted by law.101
94. 15 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-10-10(1) (2017).
95. See id. (restricting nonprofit organizations from applying to be a licensed
legal aid society if they serve a primary purpose other than provide free legal
assistance).
96. See id. § 5-10-10(4).
97. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP. OF VA., REPORT TO THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE WORK OF VIRGINIA’S LEGAL AID PROGRAMS: FY
2015-2016 2 (2016).
98. VA. RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT r. 7.1, cmt. 5 (2017).
99. See How to Form a Virginia Nonprofit Corporation: The Steps to Form a
501(c)(3) Nonprofit Corporation in Virginia, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/forming-nonprofit-corporation-virginia-36091.html (last visited
Feb. 13, 2019) [hereinafter How to Form a Virginia Nonprofit Corporation]
(explaining how to form a nonprofit corporation in Virginia) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
100. See id. (linking to the state corporation commission for the location of
form SCC819).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-814 (2017); see COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA STATE
CORPORATION COMMISSION, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF A VIRGINIA NONSTOCK
CORPORATION
SCC819
2
(2014),
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/publicforms/207/scc819.pdf (cautioning a person
seeking to organize a for-profit business as a Virginia nonstock corporation to
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Properly completing registration form SCC819 is not alone
sufficient to ensure tax-exempt status according to IRS publication
557, “Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization.”102 SCC819
requires additional addenda, including a statement of purpose
matching IRS requirements, statements agreeing not to
participate in prohibited political activities, and a plan for
dissolution of assets.103
Once on file with the State Corporation Commission, a lawyer
attempting to practice law as a nonprofit entity must file for
registration with the Virginia State Bar.104 The Virginia State Bar
permits a law firm to be registered as a professional law
corporation, a professional limited liability company, or a
registered limited liability partnership.105
In Virginia, corporations not organized for profit are exempt
from paying income tax under the laws of the United States.106 If
501(c)(3) status is granted by the IRS, Virginia also exempts such
organizations from sales and use tax, although a number of
additional qualifications apply.107 Considering the unavailability
of funding from the Legal Services Corporation of Virginia,
501(c)(3) status from the IRS becomes an even more crucial
mechanism for lowering operational costs for a nonprofit law firm
not serving as a legal aid provider.

consult an accountant or tax professional) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
102. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION, supra
note 101, at 2.
103. See How to Form a Virginia Nonprofit Corporation, supra note 99
(stating additional requirements necessary to achieve 501(c)(3) status after
proper registration as a nonstock corporation is satisfied).
104. See Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Pt. 6 § 4 para. 14 (2017)
(stating rules and regulations governing the professional conduct of the practice
of law through professional law corporations).
105. See id. (listing the different governance structures that law firms may
take).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-401 (explaining tax exemptions for nonprofits).
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.11 (same).
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2. Process for IRS Qualification as a Nonprofit

In order to apply for 501(c)(3) status with the IRS in any state,
a nonprofit law firm must complete IRS Form 1023 and include the
firm’s articles of incorporation.108 An application must also include
a description of all the firm’s proposed activities, bylaws, and
financial data.109 Submission of an application for tax-exempt
status may take place before the firm begins operation, or may be
submitted after a period of operation not exceeding 27 months.110
A nonprofit firm receiving 501(c)(3) status is permitted to accept
tax-deductible donations.111 A tax-exempt firm is thereafter
generally required to file form 990 to report donations, and must
also meet other annual requirements set out in section 501.112
B. Benefits of 501(c)(3) Status for Nonprofit Law Firms
Obtaining 501(c)(3) status offers benefits to law firms
attempting to provide legal services to low- to moderate-income
clients. Reducing operational costs through tax exemption,
soliciting tax deductible contributions from donors, and qualifying
attorneys for student loan forgiveness are advantages nonprofit
firms might leverage in order to operate a viable model.
1. Tax Exemption
In 2016, the federal government taxed a qualified personal
service corporation at a flat rate of 35%.113 Law offices are personal
service corporations if all of the corporation’s activities
substantially involve the performance of services in the law, and
at least 95% of the corporation’s stock, by value, is directly or
indirectly owned by (1) employees performing services in the law,
108. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CAT. NO. 46573C,
TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, PUBLICATION 557 22 (Jan. 2018).
109. See id. at 4. (explaining requirements for nonprofit registration)
110. See id. at 5.29 (same).
111. See id. at 21. (same).
112. See id. at 8 (same).
113. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR
FORM 1120: U.S. CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURN 17 (2016).
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(2) retired employees who performed services in the law, or (3) the
estates of such employees.114
Regardless of nonprofit status, law firms may not need to pay
state income tax. Once again using Virginia as an example, law
firms generally only need to file Virginia form 502 as pass-through
entities.115 State income tax for law firms is instead collected
through personal state income tax.116 In Virginia, the only
advantage lost at the state level by not being qualified as a
501(c)(3) is with respect to sales and use tax.117 A law firm not
qualifying as tax-exempt for federal income tax purposes is not
eligible for exemption from state income taxes.118 A later section
discusses the reasons federal tax-exempt status is necessary—yet,
still insufficient—to structure a viable model for reaching low- to
moderate-income clients.
2. Donations
Charitable organizations qualifying for tax-exempt status
may receive tax-deductible donations from individual
contributors.119 Contributions to nonqualified organizations are
not tax-deductible.120 In 2017, contributions to charitable
organizations in the United States rose to a new high, reaching
approximately $390 billion—which accounted for over 2% of
GDP.121 While only about 30% of Americans ultimately itemized
114. See id. at 17–18. (listing the IRS requirements for qualified personal
service corporations).
115. See COMMONWEALTH OF VA., DEP’T OF TAX’N, INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING
2017 FORM 502: VIRGINIA PASS-THROUGH ENTITY RETURN OF INCOME AND RETURN
OF NONRESIDENT WITHHOLDING TAX 2 (2017) (explaining which corporate entities
are not required to pay Virginia state income tax).
116. See id.
117. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.11(C)(1)(a) (describing exemptions for
nonprofit organizations).
118. See id. (same).
119. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2018) (describing allowable deductions for charitable
contributions and gifts).
120. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CAT. NO. 15050A,
Publication 526 6 (Mar. 2018) (identifying nondeductible contributions).
121. See Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TR.,
https://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/
(last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (summarizing studies regarding charitable giving by
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tax deductions before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,122 the
incentive to donate to charitable organizations was still
substantial, especially to high-income earners.123 Securing
501(c)(3) status allows a nonprofit law firm to attract donors
interested in itemizing tax deductions who might otherwise find a
different cause to support. The ability to accept donations
enhances the credibility of a nonprofit law firm in the eyes of the
community it serves while simultaneously opening the door to
additional resources that would otherwise be out of reach.124
3. Student Loan Forgiveness
The average law school graduate borrows over $110,000 to
finance their degree.125 As of 2014, the overall median starting
salary for a lawyer was $63,000 per year.126 With the burden of
paying off student debt increasing and starting salaries remaining
largely stagnant, lawyers beginning in the profession may weigh

Americans) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
122. See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. Law No. 115-97, 131
Stat. 2054, 2072 (2017) (raising the amount of the standard deduction and thus
significantly decreasing the incentive to donate to 501(c)(3) entities).
123. See Scott Greenberg, Who Itemizes Deductions?, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 22,
2016), https://taxfoundation.org/who-itemizes-deductions/ (summarizing data
provided by the IRS for the 2013 tax year) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
124. See
Primary
Benefits
of
a
501(c)(3)
Corporation,
NONPROFITLEGALCENTER.COM, http://www.nonprofitlegalcenter.com/non-profitresources/primary-benefits-501c3-corporation/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019)
(explaining advantages of gaining 501(c)(3) status) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
125. See Staci Zaretsky, Will You Ever Be Able to Pay Off Your Law School
Debt?, ABOVE THE L., https://abovethelaw.com/2017/09/will-you-ever-be-able-topay-off-your-law-school-debt/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (discussing the ominous
burden of student loan debt for young legal professionals) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
126. See Employment Rate for New Law School Graduates Rises by More Than
Two Percentage Points—But Overall Number of Jobs Falls as the Size of
Graduating Class Shrinks, NALP (July 30, 2015), https://www.nalp.org/2014_
selected_pr#table1 (demonstrating a relatively stable starting salary median
since the financial crises of 2008) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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early relief of such debt as an important factor when choosing
employment.
In some circumstances, loan forgiveness through the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program is available if a
borrower fulfills certain criteria.127 The PSLF program may
encourage lawyers to consider legal jobs that might otherwise be
unworkable for borrowers carrying large amounts of debt. Loan
forgiveness under the PSLF is not considered income for tax
purposes, thereby offering potentially significant relief in exchange
for publicly-oriented legal work.128
One of the criteria for receiving loan forgiveness is ten years
of full-time employment at a qualifying employer.129 Employment
at a nonprofit that is tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code fulfills the criteria of qualifying
employment.130 While the future of the loan forgiveness program
is uncertain and subject to change by Congress,131 nonprofit law
firms can currently leverage the possibility of loan forgiveness as
a benefit to prospective employees in order to offset lower
compensation. The ten-year duration requirement might also
stabilize employee turnover for nonprofit law firms that would
otherwise struggle to retain lawyers seeking higher salaries at
traditional firms after gaining a few years of experience.

127. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness, FED. STUDENT AID,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/publicservice#qualifying-employment (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) (explaining the
qualifications to receive student loan forgiveness) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
128. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness Questions and Answers, FED.
STUDENT
AID,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgivenesscancellation/public-service/questions (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (clarifying that
the balance of forgiven loans is not taxable as income) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
129. Id. (explaining the qualifications to receive student loan forgiveness).
130. See FED. STUDENT AID, supra note 127 (same).
131. See Zack Friedman, Trump May End Student Loan Forgiveness
Program, FORBES, (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/
2018/02/14/trump-student-loan-forgiveness/#23ee1685768d (examining the latest
budget proposal from the Trump administration) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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C. LSC-Funded Programs

An important source of funding to nonprofit law firms seeking
to increase legal access is the Legal Services Corporation (LSC).132
Often, there is a state organization serving as a supplemental
counterpart to federal LSC funding. However, funding from LSC
grants at the federal and state levels have limited reach and
application. Understanding the role of the LSC architecture
provides a better grasp of the challenges to extending legal services
to low- to moderate-income clientele.
1. LSC Impact
The Legal Services Corporation is an independent 501(c)(3)
that “promotes equal access to justice and provides grants for
high-quality civil legal assistance to low-income Americans.”133
LSC receives appropriations from Congress, and received $385
million in fiscal year 2016.134 In turn, LSC is a source of funding
for legal service providers who serve clients with annual incomes
below 125% of the federal poverty guidelines.135 Using only this
criteria, more than sixty million Americans are eligible for services
supported by LSC funding.136 The federal poverty threshold in
2016 was $14,850 for an individual and $30,380 for a family of
four.137
132. Who We Are, LSC, https://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc/who-we-are (last visited
Feb. 20, 2019) (providing a description of “the single largest funder of civil legal
aid for low-income Americans”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
133. Id.
134. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Trump Budget Eliminates Legal Services
Corp. Funding, ABA J. (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
trump_budget_eliminates_funding_for_legal_services_corp/
(explaining
the
implications of the Trump administration’s proposed budget for fiscal 2017) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
135. See LSC, supra note 132.
136. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL
LEGAL
NEEDS
OF
LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS
6
(2017),
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf
[hereinafter THE JUSTICE GAP] (giving an overview of how the Legal Services
Corporation attempts to serve low income clients).
137. See id. at 60.
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LSC offers basic field grants to increase access to civil legal
services in accordance with Title X of 42 U.S.C. § 2996.138Eligibility
for basic field grants requires assurances that the recipient will
adhere to the Rules of Professional Conduct, LSC Performance
Criteria, and ABA standards.139 Basic field grants are used to
deliver civil legal services in accordance with an approved grant
application and cannot be used for any statutorily restricted
purposes.140
For example, in Virginia the LSC provided over six million
dollars in basic field grants in 2015, funding six programs and
supporting the close of over 20,000 cases.141 Nearly 15% of
Virginians live at or below 125% of the federal poverty line,
rendering about 1.2 million Virginians facially eligible for
representation through LSC funded programs.142
The types of services supported by LSC grants are generally
related to family law, consumer issues, employment matters and
housing and foreclosure cases.143 Approximately 45% of the
Virginia cases closed in 2017 by LSC funded programs concerned
family law, about 20% related to housing, 16% percent related to
consumer law, and 9% related to employment and income.144 While
LSC funding represents vital cash flow for nonprofits providing
civil legal services to low-income clients, it is by no means
sufficient to meet the total legal needs of even the most
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2018) (setting out the general purpose and
objectives of the Legal Services Corporation).
139. See 2018 Grant Terms and Conditions, LSC, https://lsclive.app.box.com/s/ay5a931g2ien57ll4fb0in4riduj1c7x (last visited Jan. 25, 2019)
(setting out expectations for recipients of basic field grants) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
140. See id. (noting the restricted activities under the grant).
141. See Virginia State Profile, LSC, https://www.lsc.gov/grants-granteeresources/our-grantees/virginia-state-profile (last visited Feb. 20, 2019)
[hereinafter Virginia State Profile] https://www.lsc.gov/grants-granteeresources/our-grantees/virginia-state-profile (reporting the impact of LSC
funding in the state of Virginia) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
142. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 136, at 62 (calculating the number
of potential eligible clients to receive representation through LSC supported
programs).
143. See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 136.
144. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 141 (breaking down case closures
and staffing in 2017).
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disadvantaged clients.145 In 2017, LSC estimated more than half of
legal issues submitted to LSC funded programs received
inadequate or no assistance because of a lack of resources.146
2. LSC Restrictions
Even if available resources were sufficient, there are still
many issues and needs that cannot be supported using LSC funds.
LSC funding may not generally be used in support of a
fee-generating case.147 The purpose of this restriction is to keep
limited public legal resources from being used where other private
legal representation is accessible.148 Although LSC funds are
available under limited circumstances for fee-generating cases,
exceptions are not easily qualified.149
Categorically, accepting LSC funds may also restrict attorneys
not only from using LSC funds to represent certain clients on
certain claims, but also restrict attorneys from using private funds
or other public funds to represent clients or participate in various
activities.150 Such categories include representing prisoners in civil
litigation, participating in any class action lawsuit, abortion
litigation, and representing non-U.S. citizens unless specifically
permitted to do so by statutory exception.151 Other categories are
less restrictive and may allow an attorney to participate in certain
activities so long as LSC funding or private funding is not

145. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 136, at 13 (recognizing that many
legal needs remain unmet by programs supported in-part through LSC funding).
146. Id. at 8.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1) (2018) (identifying a limitation on grants and
contracts in connection with legal assistance to eligible clients).
148. 45 C.F.R. § 1609.1 (2017) (“This part is designed . . . [t]o ensure that
recipients do not use scarce legal services resources when private attorneys are
available to provide effective representation . . . .”).
149. 45 C.F.R. § 1609.3 (2017) (setting out how fee-generating cases must
have been rejected by the local lawyer referral service, or by two private attorneys;
or that neither the referral service nor two private attorneys will consider the case
without payment of a consultation fee).
150. See LSC, supra note 139 (explaining the limitations on attorneys who
accept LSC funding).
151. See id. (listing, though not comprehensively, the restrictions dictating
how LSC funding can be used).
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appropriated for a particular purpose.152 For example, attorneys
receiving LSC funding may participate in public school
desegregation proceedings, but only by using other publicly
designated funds, and not private funds or LSC funds.153 Finally,
lawyer engagement is sometimes permitted, but with a restriction
on using LSC funds.154 For example, an attorney wishing to
represent a client in an action against the LSC may do so as long
as he or she does not use LSC funding.155 The attorney may use
other private funding or other public funding.156
3. State LSC Funding
As noted above, LSC funding provided by Congress only makes
up between 27% and 55% of funding for individual LSC supported
programs in Virginia.157 State governments sometimes fund LSC
programs through a similar state structure, seen in states such as
New Jersey, Delaware, Nevada, Utah, and Virginia.158
The Legal Services Corporation of Virginia (LSCV) provides
civil legal services to Virginia’s low-income residents through
funding from the Virginia General Assembly.159 In 2015–2016,
152. See id. (recognizing a distinction between the most limiting restrictions,
and restrictions that permit greater attorney autonomy).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. (identifying categories wherein only LSC funding is restricted
from use).
157. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 136.
158. See NEV. LEGAL SERVS. INC., https://nlslaw.net (last visited Jan. 8, 2018)
(demonstrating a state structure designed to provide additional support to LSC
funding) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); LEGAL SERVS. N.J., https://www.lsnj.org/LegalServicesOffices.aspx (last
visited Jan. 8, 2018) (same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice); LEGAL SERVS. CORP. DEL., INC., https://www.lscd.com
(last visited Jan. 8, 2018) (same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil
Rights
&
Social
Justice);
UTAH
LEGAL
SERVS.,
https://www.utahlegalservices.org (last visited Jan. 8, 2018) (same) (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
159. See REPORT TO THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE
WORK OF VIRGINIA’S LEGAL AID PROGRAMS; FY 2015–2016, LEGAL SERVICES CORP.
VA.,
ii
(2016)
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5632a199e4b
OF
0292ace726ae4/t/587e4d80cd0f68450bf9b7b1/1484672409265/LSCV+FY15-16+
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nearly eleven million dollars were distributed to legal aid
programs across Virginia.160 State funding from the LSCV made
up over 50% of funding received by programs also receiving federal
LSC support.161 Meanwhile, LSC funding only accounted for 32%
percent of funding received by programs in Virginia receiving LSC
support.162
Without both LSCV and LSC funding, legal aid services would
not be able to provide anywhere close to the current level of
services presently available. But because funding from the state
and federal levels combined still fails to meet the needs of even the
most economically disadvantaged clientele, funding for
underserved moderate-income clientele is unlikely to be considered
through LSC sources at any time in the near future.
D. Sliding-Scale Non-LSC Funded Law Firms.
As noted above, LSC funding is facially inadequate to meet
civil litigation demands for persons living below 125% of the
federal poverty line. Additionally, extensive limitations are placed
on representation of such persons even where funding is available.
Thus, law firms have experimented with alternative ways to
deliver services to those clients struggling to find access to justice.
Earning income falling below 125% of the Federal Poverty line
reflects grim circumstances. In 2017, a family of four could have
earned no more than $30,750 to qualify for legal services supported
by federal LSC funding.163 Meanwhile, the same family of four
could have earned up to $33,948 and qualified for full Medicaid
Overview_ Revised+1-13-2017_1pm.pdf (explaining the source and purpose of state
money used to fund civil legal services in Virginia) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
160. Id.
161. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 141 (breaking down the distribution
of LSC funding against other sources).
162. Id.
163. U.S. Federal Poverty Guidelines Used to Determine Financial Eligibility
for Certain Federal Programs: Annual 2017 Federal Poverty Guidelines for the 48
Contiguous States, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR PLAN. AND EVALUATION, https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines
(last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
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coverage.164 In other words, a sick patient in a family of four could
be fully covered by Medicaid, but fail to qualify for the opportunity
to receive legal support from an LSC funded program if a HIPPA
violation occurred during medical treatment.
1. Targeted Population for Sliding-Scale Law Firms.
While access to legal representation for Americans living
below 125% of the Federal Poverty Level is limited, about 60% of
Americans live at or below 400% of the Federal Poverty Level.165
The incomes for households between 125% and 400% of the Federal
Poverty Level ranged from $30,751 to $98,400 in 2017.166 Nonprofit
firms accepting fees from clients, or representing clients for this
income range, may entirely lose access to both federal and state
LSC funding.167 But some firms nevertheless choose to operate as
a nonprofit in hope of serving clients within this income range.168
As noted above, a law firm may qualify for tax-exempt status
as a legal aid organization only if it collects fees based on a client’s
ability to pay, rather than by the services rendered.169 Because
legal aid organizations receiving LSC funding must generally
provide services without charging a fee, and must not provide
services to persons earning more than 125% of the federal poverty
threshold, the effective policy conclusion might be that persons
below the federal poverty threshold do not possess any ability to
pay for any services rendered. So far, the IRS has not prohibited
164. HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/ (last visited Jan. 12,
2018) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
165. See Distribution of the Total Population by Federal Poverty Level (Above
and Below 400% FPL), THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/population-up-to-400-fpl/?currentTime
frame=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%
22%7D (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (aggregating data and creating estimates for
Census-defined family units in 2016) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
166. Id.
167. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LSC RESTRICTIONS AND OTHER FUNDING
SOURCES 1 (2018) https://lsc-live.app.box.com/s/whds6u09dcvquut3c5t40 f48hzpjlj8y
(“No representation in f
available or the case meets one of the exceptions stated in 45 C.F.R. Part 1609”).
168. Id.
169. Rev. Rul. 78-428, supra note 92.
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nonprofit law firms from charging fees, even to the most indigent
clients.170 What the IRS does prohibit is for a non-profit firm to
charge a market rate for services to clients who can pay for legal
representation, while the firm also applies a sliding scale fee
structure to clients who cannot afford to pay for legal services at
the market rate.171 In short, a nonprofit, tax-exempt law firm may
create a fee structure that charges fees and extends support to
persons earning above or below 125% of the federal poverty
guideline up until such client could afford legal services at the
market rate.172 But market rate services may not be rendered in
order to subsidize services provided to persons without the ability
to pay.173 No client of a nonprofit law firm may be charged the full
market rate for legal services.174
2. Examples of Sliding Scale Law Firms.
The concept of a sliding-scale law firm is long-established.
Since 1967, SWLA Law Center in Louisiana has operated as a
private, not-for-profit law firm supported through a combination of
donations and client fees.175 The stated goal of the SWLA Law
170. See id. (suggesting that a tax-exempt firm may charge fees to even the
most indigent clients because “[t]he fees charged do not negate . . . from the
substantial economic relief provided to the poor and distressed by the
organization.”).
171. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b) (explaining that an organization cannot
carry on activities broader than the purpose specified for which its tax exempt
status was granted); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b) (2017) (same).
172. See
AM.
BAR
ASS’N,
Alternate
Fee
Arrangements,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal_services/initiatives_awards/
alternative_fees/ (last visited May 5, 2019) (“Sliding-scale fees are based on a
client’s ability to pay, often determined by income and family size, derived from
the Federal Poverty Guidelines.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
173. See Rev. Rul. 78-428, supra note 92 (“The fees charged do not negate or
significantly detract from the substantial economic relief provided to the poor and
distressed by the organization.”).
174. See Non-Profit Law Firms and Co-Pay Clinics: An Option for Affordable
Legal Services, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/delivery_legal_services
/ls_del_smith_client-centric_slides.pdf
(“Look to what private attorneys are charging in the area and reduce cost from
there (for example, 1/3 to 1/4 of market price.”) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
175. See Frequently Asked Questions, SWLA LAW CTR., http://swla-law-
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Center is to “serve those whose household incomes are too low to
be able to afford a private attorney, but are too high to qualify for
Legal Aid.”176 As a matter of scope, SWLA Law Center handles only
civil matters in non-fee generating cases, focusing primarily on
family law, property rights, and wills.177 With the support of
donations, SWLA Law Center claims to gather more than half of
its funding from the reduced fees charged directly to clients.178
Open Legal Services of Salt Lake City, Utah represents a
slightly different conceptualization of the sliding-scale law firm.179
Because Open Legal Services is registered as a 501(c)(3), it may
not seek fees from any of its clients at the standard market rate,
but instead must charge clients based on their ability to pay.180
Open Legal Services offers transparency about its fees.181 At the
low-end, Open Legal Services charges $75 per hour to clients at or
below 125% of the Federal Poverty Level.182 The fee jumps to $115
per hour for clients making between 200% and 250% of the Federal
Poverty Level.183 Finally, clients making between 250% and 300%
of the Federal Poverty Level pay an hourly rate of $145.184 While
center.com/faq.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (explaining how SWLA operates
and which clientele are served) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
176. Id.
177. See Practice, SWLA L. CTR., http://swla-L-center.com/practice.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2018) (defining the scope of representation offered by SWLA Law
Center) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
178. See Home, SWLA L. CTR., http://swla-law-center.com/index-2.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2018) (purporting to operate with more than 50% of operational
costs covered by client fees, and the remainder generated from donations from
community partners and sources such as United Way) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
179. See Zuckerman, supra note 10, (describing a sliding scale model that
attempts to specifically reach moderate-income clients).
180. See Rev. Rul. 78-428, supra note 92 (“The fees charged by the
organization are not based upon the type of service rendered, but are based upon
the indigents' abilities to pay.”).
181. See Do I Qualify, OPEN LEGAL SERVS., https://openlegalservices.org/do-iqualify/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (explaining the sliding-scale model used by
Open Legal Services) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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Open Legal Services only presents its fees as a general estimate
for potential clients, it also notes a ten-hour retainer fee is usually
required up front, resulting in a minimum base representation
amount of $750.185
Comparing SWLA Law Center and Open Legal Services, there
are two notable differences. The first is Open Legal Services takes
not only civil cases, but also criminal cases.186 The second, and
perhaps more significant, is Open Legal Services is structured with
the objective to meet all of its operational needs from client fees.187
A review of Open Legal Services’ financial reporting documents
shows significant growth in revenue from services provided,
amounting to $424,208 in 2016.188 However, in both 2015 and 2016,
revenue from program services was below total expenses for the
firm, and each year the difference was balanced by donations.189
Donations to Open Legal Services rose from $9,641 in 2015 to
$49,690 in 2016, but the entire increase in revenue from donations
was translated into firm salaries rather than into fixed assets.190
Part IV. Nonprofit Law Firms are Incapable of Filling the Justice
Gap.
LSC-funded law firms are already incapable of meeting
demands for clients earning below 125% of the federal poverty
185. Id.
186. See
Criminal
Law,
OPEN LEGAL SERV.,
https://openlegal
services.org/criminal-law/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (providing a list of criminal
matters that Open Legal Services might handle) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
187. See Donate, OPEN LEGAL SERV., https://openlegalservices.org/about/
donate/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Our business is structured so that we can
meet all of our operational needs from client fees.”) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
188. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990, OPEN
LEGAL
SERV.
2016,
https://openlegalservices.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/12/2016-990-Scanned.pdf (showing a year-over-year increase of revenue
from $378,155 in 2015) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
189. See id. (recognizing that in both 2015 and 2016, total expenses for the
firm were not covered by program service revenue and fell short by $21,663 in
2016).
190. Id.
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line.191 Non-LSC-funded non-profit law firms do not appear
structurally capable of meeting the legal demands of all low- to
moderate-income clients. And even under optimal conditions, the
ability of a non-profit, sliding-scale law firm to grow and thrive is
stifled by Model Rule 5.4 and IRS restrictions.192 Two factors that
help defeat a sliding-scale model geared toward moderate-income
clients are: (1) operational flaws associated with non-profit
management,193 and (2) the inability of nonprofit firms to hire and
retain skilled lawyers pressured into seeking high-earnings by
oppressive law school debt.194
A. Non-Profit Law Firm Management.
1. Lawyers are Poorly-Equipped to Grow Nonprofit Firms.
Lawyers do not receive the training necessary to develop and
grow non-profit firms effectively. As noted above, operating a
non-profit law firm requires adherence to IRS restrictions not
applicable to most law firms.195 Law practice management has
slowly evolved over the last twenty years in recognition of the
numerous skills required for lawyers to be professionally
successful.196 Scholarship around the subject of law practice
191. The Justice Gap, supra note 136 at 8 (stating that an estimated 1.1
million eligible legal problems were projected to go unmet by an LSC-funded legal
aid organization in 2017).
192. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980)
(limiting how attorneys share fees); see also Rev. Rul. 78-428, supra note 92
(explaining how a firm must set specific fees to remain tax exempt).
193. See Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An
Economic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures,
62 EMORY L.J. 999, 1082 (2013) (“It has been a flaw in nonprofit directors'
thinking that profit should not be central to a nonprofit's operations, and that
flaw is furthered if not founded in the IRS's commerciality doctrine and
substantial purpose tests.”).
194. See Luize E. Zubrow, Is Loan Forgiveness Divine? Another View, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 451, 454 (1991) (stating that law schools should cancel law school
debt “because of increased educational debt, there is a shortage of qualified
lawyers willing to work for poverty law organizations, nonprofit advocacy groups,
and the government”).
195. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 108.
196. See Gary A. Munneke, Managing a Law Practice: What You Need to
Learn in Law School, 30 PACE L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2010) (recognizing increasing
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management addresses human resources, fees and billing,
compensation, marketing, and trends within the profession.197 But
nonprofit law firms, from the outset, do not resemble for-profit law
firms.
Nonprofit law firms must have a board of directors, and a
board of directors may retain authority to direct the plans and
policies of an organization.198 For example, Open Legal Services
lists ten board members as directly involved with the oversight of
the organization.199 Although the board of directors at a nonprofit
law firm may not directly control the professional judgment of a
lawyer at the firm, the board may determine lawyer compensation,
rental space for the firm, and other major aspects of organizational
heading.200 If not carefully structured, election to, and decisions by,
a board of directors can become highly politicized.201 This dynamic
is one with which many young or inexperienced lawyers are
naturally unfamiliar.
In addition, nonprofit law firms must comply with reporting
requirements that are not relevant to for-profit firms.202 These
requirements may prompt the generation of governing
mechanisms such as employee review processes, strategies for
avoiding conflicts of interests, supervision of solicitation for
donations, and training in areas such as maintaining donor
privacy.203
What is readily apparent is that a basic understanding of law
firm operations leaves much to be understood about the unique
requirements of operating a nonprofit law firm. The operational
requirements of a nonprofit law firm are an addition to, not a
publication on articles and resources addressing how to manage law firms).
197. See id. at 1215–17 (listing articles related to topics of interest for
managing law firms).
198. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, STARTING AND MANAGING A NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATION: A LEGAL GUIDE, 16–17 (6th ed. 2013) (explaining that the
authority structure of a nonprofit can become muddled).
199. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 188 at 7 (listing board members
for Open Legal Services).
200. See HOPKINS, supra note 198, at 51–52 (explaining ways that a nonprofit
organization may be impacted by decisions through a board of directors).
201. See id. at 17–18 (discussing various election systems for a board of
directors).
202. See id. at 95 (discussing IRS reporting requirements via Form 990).
203. See id. at 97–98 (listing relevant nonprofit governance principles).
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substitution for, an already demanding professional business
model. The complexities of managing a nonprofit structure require
time, and necessarily detract from representing clients and
growing the firm in a way that can reach a larger market share. In
spite of a decades-old recognition that access to justice for
moderate-income Americans is inadequate, relatively few firms
have entered the market in an attempt to access moderate-income
clients.204 The demands of the model may simply be too daunting.
2. Fundraising Efforts Face Difficult Marketing Challenges.
Nonprofit law firms are required to charge below-market rates
for legal services, making fundraising an essential element for
meeting overhead expenses.205 Marketing fundraising efforts
cannot reasonably hope to be both successful and passive.
Successful marketing of fundraising efforts are more effective if
customers can spread the word about personal experiences with a
developed brand, as well as promote social proof to encourage
donations.206 Open Legal Services, for example, has employed a
number of marketing strategies by building their brand through
storytelling, promoting the unique value of the firm, and
highlighting media features such as articles published in The
Atlantic.207 Yet in spite of economic growth and increase in
charitable donations by individuals, donations to Open Legal
Services have been flat.208 In 2014, contributions and grants
204. See Karen A. Lash, et. al., Equal Access to Civil Justice: Pursuing
Solutions Beyond the Legal Profession, 17 YALE L. POL’Y REV. 489, 492 (1998)
(recognizing twenty years ago that moderate-income Californians had little or no
equal access to civil justice).
205. See supra note 171 (explaining nonprofits may not provide services at
market rates).
206. See Nine Valuable Marketing Lessons from a Nonprofit—
Charitywater.org, KISSMETRICS BLOG, https://blog.kissmetrics.com/marketinglessons-from-charitywater/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (describing the successful
marketing techniques of a major nonprofit) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
207. See Open Legal Services in the News, OPEN LEGAL SERVS.,
https://openlegalservices.org/about/in-the-news/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2019)
(listing stories featuring the firm or members of the firm with access links) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
208. See Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST,
https://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/
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represented 18% of total revenue, while in 2016, contributions and
grants represented 11% of total revenue.209 While at first glance,
this allocation of revenue stream away from contributions and
grants may suggest improved self-reliance, it more pointedly raises
the question of how a firm that cannot charge market rates for
legal services can increase caseload without increasing the deficit
created by charging below-market rates. The numbers suggest the
answer has been for the firm to dramatically raise its hourly rates.
In the three years since the publication of a widely circulated
article in The Atlantic, Open Legal Services has raised its rates for
its lowest-earning clients by 50%.210
This is not to criticize Open Legal Services for adjusting its fee
structure to meet the demands of its business model. This is merely
to illustrate that a reduced ratio of contributions and grants
requires an increase in hourly fees to compensate for a larger
caseload. Operational costs might only be reduced to a certain
point. At which point costs are fully minimized, the addition of a
case at less than the market rate can only be balanced by
donations.
Marketing for the purpose of obtaining donations must deal
with the attractiveness of an individual’s donation from the donor’s
perspective. There are over 1.5 million tax-exempt organizations
in the United States.211 Law firms attempting to solicit donations
(last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (showing that Americans gave $410.02 billion in 2017,
representing a 5.2% increase from 2016); see also U.S. Economy at a Glance:
Perspective from the BEA Accounts, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS,
https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/glance.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2019)
(reporting that personal income growth, while anemic, is increasing) (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); Nonprofit
Disclosure
Documents,
OPEN
LEGAL
SERVS.,
https://openlegalservices.org/nonprofit-disclosures/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2019)
(giving access to reporting that shows, with a $40,000 anomaly in 2016, effectively
no growth in donations for the periods reported) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
209. See OPEN LEGAL SERVS., supra note 207 (demonstrating a decrease in
percentage of contributions and grants that represented total revenue).
210. See Zuckerman, supra note 10 (noting that the anecdotal case selected
for the article demonstrated a legal fee of $40 per hour, while the current
minimum fee at Open Legal Services is $75 per hour, with a ten hour minimum
retainer).
211. See Quick Facts About Nonprofits, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATS.,
http://nccs.urban.org/data-statistics/quick-facts-about-nonprofits (last visited
Jan. 28, 2019) (breaking down basic public charity statistics through 2016) (on
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on behalf of moderate-income clients face substantial competition
from organizations with arguably more compelling narratives.
Additionally, seventy-percent of Americans consider themselves
middle class, meaning donations in support of legal services for
“moderate income” clients would be an exercise in cognitive
dissonance for all but the highest-earning Americans (so long as
these Americans also recognize they are high-earning).212
Convincing “middle class” Americans to support a nonprofit legal
firm that does not provide free services to “lower class” Americans
may not be a plausible sell. High-earning Americans may also find
the cause less gratifying than supporting LSC-funded legal aid
organizations supporting the lowest-earning Americans. The
urgency to support legal services for low- to moderate-income
clients is therefore minimized compared to the need to support
legal services for desperately poor clientele.
B. Non-Profit Law Firms Cannot Hire and Retain Skilled
Lawyers.
One of the most important business strategies necessary to a
successful law firm is the recruitment and retention of skilled
lawyers. Law firms are better positioned to hire and retain skilled
talent when recognizing the expectations and concerns of lawyers
entering the workforce.213 While flexibility of hours and styles of
leadership are important factors to young lawyers, economic
realities discourage young lawyers from making long-term
commitments to non-profit law firms, especially where the lawyers
themselves would be qualified for discount services. Again, using
Open Legal Services as an example, in 2016 the president of the
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
212. See Emmie Martin, 70% of Americans Consider Themselves Middle
Class—But
Only
50%
Are,
CNBC
(Jun.
30,
2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/30/70-percent-of-americans-consider-themselvesmiddle-class-but-only-50-percent-are.html
(describing
the
long-observed
difference between middle-class status and the perception of middle-class status)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
213. See Cheryl Cran, The Future of Work in the Legal Profession: What Firm
Leaders Need to Know About Working with Their Young Talent, 43 No. 6 L. PRAC.
38 (2017) (explaining the shift in expectations young lawyers have for their first
jobs as well as their careers).
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firm earned $48,500.214 But a single mother earning this amount
would qualify for representation by Open Legal Services.215
For law students who borrow, the average graduate faces over
$110,000 in debt.216 Unlike most debt, student loan debt is not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.217 The current interest rate for an
unsubsidized Federal Stafford Loan is 6%.218 Therefore, for
$110,000 of loan debt accruing 6% interest, a borrower must pay
$1,221 each month for ten years in order to expunge the debt.219 In
2015, “the median private sector salary was $68,300 and the
median public sector salary was $52,000.”220 Both of these salaries
fall into the 22% taxable income bracket for 2018.221
214. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 188, at 7.
215. See OPEN LEGAL SERVS., https://openlegalservices.org/cost/ (last visited
Jan. 28, 2019) (presenting a chart of annual incomes whereby clients may qualify
for services) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
216. See Staci Zaretsky, Will You Ever Be Able to Pay Off Your Law School
Debt??, ABOVE THE L. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/09/will-youever-be-able-to-pay-off-your-law-school-debt/ (discussing the challenges of
managing law school debt) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
217. See Robert Farrington, Law School and Student Loan Debt: Be Careful,
FORBES (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2014/
12/18/law-school-and-student-loan-debt-be-careful/#6a12565e11f9 (recognizing
that students who take on enormous amounts of debt run the risk of never being
able to pay it off) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
218. See Interest Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/
loans/interest-rates (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (describing the various interest
rates of federal student loans) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
219. See Student Loan Payment Calculator, STUDENT LOAN HERO,
https://studentloanhero.com/calculators/student-loan-payment-calculator/ (last
visited Jan. 28, 2019) (plugging in data at 6% interest in order to derive monthly
payments and total interest paid) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
220. See Ilana Kowarski, U.S. News Data: Law School Costs, Salary
Prospects, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/education/bestgraduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2017-03-15/us-news-data-law-schoolcosts-salary-prospects (summarizing data reported from law schools regarding
earnings of graduates) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
221. See
2018
Tax
Brackets, TAX FOUND.
(Jan.
2,
2018),
https://taxfoundation.org/2018-tax-brackets (estimating tax brackets for
unmarried individuals) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
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Taking the facts above, suppose a lawyer in the private sector
earned $68,300 in 2018 and carried $110,000 in law school debt at
6% interest. He or she would actually bring home only $4,439 per
month after taxes, less $1,221 for law school debt payment. The
lawyer’s actual living expenses would therefore need to be satisfied
by $3,218. Expecting a reasonable rent rate for a one-bedroom
apartment in a mid to major U.S. city to be about $1,200 per
month, the lawyer would retain only about $2,000 for all
remaining expenses, or about $500 per week.222 Meanwhile, a
lawyer working in the public sector earning $52,000 under the
same analysis, would bring home only $239 per week. The lawyer
would have to maintain this lifestyle for ten years in order to clear
$110,000 of law school debt. That is to say, the pressure on a young
lawyer to earn more money as quickly as possible is significant.
For a financially strained firm, lawyer turnover merely adds
additional expenses that must be absorbed by limited resources.
But in current market conditions, training and integrating
replacement attorneys is unlikely to provide long-term returns.
Because growth of a non-profit, non-LSC funded law firm is
curtailed by economic structural limitations and employment
realities, starting firms of this kind remains an unattractive option
for most law school graduates or mid-career professionals. For
firms already attempting to reach an underserved market of low- to
moderate-income clients, the economies of scale necessary to lower
costs of providing services cannot be achieved easily, if at all. The
larger a non-profit, non-LSC funded firm becomes, the more capital
it must raise through grants and contributions. Because grants
and contributions are not likely to be easily accessed by firms
serving moderate-income clients, the firm necessarily outgrows its
own ability to expand. Little choice remains but for the firm to
raise hourly rates, thus virtually pricing out the clientele it was
intended to serve.

222. See Andrew DePietro, Here’s What an Average Apartment Costs in 50
U.S. Cities, HUFFPOST (Jun. 7, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.
com/gobankingrates/heres-what-an-average-apa_b_10346298.html
(compiling
data on rent rates for one-bedroom apartments in select U.S. cities) (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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V. Potential Benefits of Relaxing Model Rule 5.4

The idea that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 could be
relaxed to broaden access to legal services is nothing new.223 Yet in
spite of continued lawyer underemployment,224 as well as broad
recognition that moderate-income earners do not seek legal
counsel to meet their needs,225 there has been no substantive
change in Model Rule 5.4 since the Kutak Commission. The
percentage of people with moderate means who seek legal advice
is only about half.226 The legal needs of low- to moderate-income
persons arguably do not require the special attention of a lawyer.
But an argument resting on this premise is deeply cynical.227
Low- to moderate-income persons who are nonlawyers do not know
without consulting a lawyer which legal issues require a lawyer’s
attention and which issues do not.228

223. See George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class
Access to Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s
Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 798–99 (2001)
(explaining the possibility of expanding legal services through the model provided
by the medical profession).
224. See Andrew Soergel, Hiring Outlook Bleak for New Law Grads, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2016-08-18/hiring-outlook-bleak-for-new-law-grads (recognizing that the class of
2015 acquired fewer private practice jobs than any graduating class over nearly
two decades) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
225. See AM. BAR ASS’N. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERV., REPORT ON
THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 11–12 (2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2016FLSReport
_FNL_WEB.pdf (reemphasizing present strategies to improve access to justice for
poor and moderate-income clientele are insufficient) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
226. See Ian Weinstein, Coordinating Access to Justice for Low- and
Moderate-Income People, N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 504–05 (2017)
(presenting the low rate of engagement between moderate-income persons and
legal professionals).
227. See AM. BAR ASS’N. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERV., supra note
225, at 14 (“[T]he study did not delve into the severity of the legal problems people
confront and left open the question of how many would benefit from formal
assistance (including from a lawyer.”).
228. See id. (“When asked why they do not seek out a lawyer, most individuals
reply that they ‘do not think of their justice problems as legal’ and do not recognize
their problems as having legal solutions.”).
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Rethinking Model Rule 5.4 is productive because it permits
business structures whereby a firm interested in providing
services to an underserved market at discounted rates may provide
services at full price in order to subsidize a corporate mission.229
The mission need not require 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.230
Rethinking Model Rule 5.4 is also productive because it allows
nonlawyer corporations to provide services in areas where low- to
moderate-income persons can easily identify their own needs.231
There are a number of practice areas where a corporation might
develop mechanisms to reduce costs of legal counsel, including
family law, housing issues, immigration, and access to healthcare
and public benefits—to name a few.232 Rather than attempt
exploration of all possible impacts to all applicable practice areas,
the potential impact on the practice area of wills and estates
planning is considered below.233
A. Need for Estate Planning
According to a Gallup poll taken May 4–8, 2016, only about
44% of Americans “have a will that describes how they would like
their money to be handled after their death.”234 The percentage of
Americans with a will and part of a household earning between
$30,000 and $75,000 per year decreased by ten percent between
229. See Schiff, supra note 79, at 1018 (“It is apparent that the modern law
firm emphasizes profitability and, as such, more frequently conducts itself just
like any business. Therefore, a rule restricting this natural progression, as Model
Rule 5.4 does, simply cannot stand.”).
230. Cf. SALVOS LEGAL, supra note 72 (demonstrating the Salvation Army
model employed in Australia).
231. See Robinson, supra note 7 (referencing the Co-Operative model
employed in the United Kingdom).
232. See AM. BAR ASSOC., Programs to Help People of Modest Means Obtain
Legal
Help,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal_services/resources/programs
_to_help_those_with_moderate_income/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (naming
programs that provide services within these practice areas at a low cost across
the nation) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
233. See infra Part IV.A.
234. Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Do Not Have a Will, GALLUP NEWS
(May 18, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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2005 and 2016, falling to 38%.235 The same year, 31% of all
American households represented this income earning range.236
Likewise, the percentage of Americans with a will and part of a
household earning less than $30,000 fell to 31%,237 while 44% of
Americans represented households in this income earning
range.238 In short, about 75% of American households earn less
than $75,000 per year, and more than six out of ten Americans
living in these households do not have a will.239
As the American population ages over the next several
decades, wealth transfer will occur at levels not previously
observed.240 While it is true individuals should make wills to
ensure guardianship of children, protection of a business, control
of the disposition of assets, or allaying stress of loved ones, there
are also broader implications.241 Intestacy is likely to result in high
transaction costs and inefficient allocation of resources, especially
when the decedent requires substantial care prior to death.242
Intestacy disproportionately affects descendants of middle or
lower-class economic status.243 Fear of death may discourage
235. Id.
236. See Matthew Frankel, Here’s the Average American Household Income:
How
Do
You
Compare?,
USA
TODAY
(Nov.
24,
2016),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2016/11/24/averageamerican-household-income/93002252/ (breaking down household incomes by
percentage of Americans falling within specific ranges of income) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
237. Jones, supra note 234.
238. Frankel, supra note 236.
239. Jones, supra note 234.
240. See Eido Walny & Kelly Dancy, Family Feuds: Mediating Estate and
Probate Disputes, 88 SEP WIS. LAW. 24, 26 (2015) (recognizing an imminent and
unprecedented shift in wealth transfer through inheritance, approaching $41
trillion by 2052).
241. See 5 Reasons You Should Create a Last Will, ROCKETLAWYER,
https://www.rocketlawyer.com/article/5-reasons-you-should-create-a-will.rl (last
visited Jan. 28, 2019) (warning of the personal impacts on loved ones that can
develop by not preparing a last will) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
242. See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt
Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 878 (2012) (explaining the widespread
intestacy results in economic unfairness, and how such should be resolved
through public policy strategies).
243. See id. (recognizing that high-earning Americans are much more likely
to have concluded testamentary instruments).
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people of all income levels from making a formal will, but
inaccessibility to an expensive and complex will-making process is
also a deterrent.244 Something can and should be done to address
this problem.
Access to prepared documents has improved over the last
twenty years through document assembly software.245 Perhaps the
most recognizable brand in the area of legal documents
preparation is LegalZoom.246 LegalZoom offers customers
document preparation support to construct a last will, living trust,
living will, and power of attorney.247 For additional cost, customers
may purchase access to an independently-contracted lawyer who
reviews prepared documents, although customers are not required
to purchase this access.248 Depending on answers to preselected
questions,249 the range of cost to the customer may fall well below
rates charged by an attorney, depending on the geographic
location, experience, and expertise of the attorney. 250 The potential

244. See id. at 879 (arguing the fear of death alone is insufficient to explain
aversion to will-making, given the evidence of widespread non-testamentary
transfers).
245. See Benjamin P. Cooper, Access to Justice Without Lawyers, 47 AKRON L.
REV. 205, 208 (2014) (noting the rise of such programs as TurboTax and
LegalZoom).
246. See generally LEGAL ZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/index-c.html (last
visited Jan. 28, 2019) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
247. See generally id.
248. See
Estate
Planning
Bundle,
LEGAL
ZOOM,
https://www.legalzoom.com/personal/estate-planning/estate-planningbundle.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (explaining how LegalZoom connects
customers to external, independent lawyers who can, at their discretion, provide
legal advice).(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil rights & Social
Justice).
249. See
Your
Personalized
Estate
Plan,
LEGAL
ZOOM,
https://www.legalzoom.com/personal/estate-planning/estate-planning-bundle.html
(Follow “Start my Estate Plan” hyperlink; then “Virginia” in the drop-down box)
(exploring various price ranges for a customer in the state of Virginia) (last visited
May 5, 2019) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
250. See USAO Attorney’s Fees Matrix—2015–2017, JUSTICE.GOV,
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/file/889176/download (last visited Jan. 28, 2019)
(providing a methodology and matrix of attorney fees for calculation of reasonable
attorney fees) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
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for client savings is substantial, and the service is merely a
function of internet access and moderate expense.251
Although internet document preparation may be an
improvement over no access at all, developing a will is a highly
private endeavor.252 For many, following the directions on a
prepared form or exchanging electronic communication with a
contracted attorney may provide an inferior experience with those
who are able to sit down with a responsive human being and gain
assurance that a legal document has been properly executed.
B. Relaxing Model Rule 5.4 Allows Corporations to Begin to Fill
the Gap
Corporations have demonstrated an ability to fill gaps in
access to other areas where professional expertise is also
available.253 Teeth whitening, eye care, pharmacy services, and tax
preparation have all been integrated into corporate models without
significantly risking the health, safety, or security of customers in
need of those services.254 There is little reason to believe legal
services in areas such as wills and trusts need be held to any
greater standard.255 Tax preparation services are considered below
as a reasonable comparison and intersection point to increase
access to wills preparation.256

251. See Helping 20 Million People. Just Like You., ROCKETLAWYER,
https://www.rocketlawyer.com/about-us.rl (last visited Jan. 29, 2019) (showing
the ease by which an internet user may obtain legal support) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
252. Jenna Cho, What Every Estate Planning Lawyer Wants You to Know
About Death and Dying, FORBES (Jun. 13, 2016, 6:02 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeenacho/2016/06/13/what-every-estate-planninglawyer-wants-you-to-know-about-death-and-dying/#3860de7d1a87 (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
253. See, e.g., Express Exam, 1800CONTACTS, https://www.1800contacts.
com/express-exam/landing (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) (explaining the willingness
businesses to offer traditionally-in person services, like eye exams) (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
254. See generally, e.g., id.
255. See LEGALZOOM, supra note 248 (serving as an example that trust and
estate legal services can be performed online).
256. See infra notes 257–263 and accompanying text.
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In 1955 H&R Block was founded as an income tax return
preparation company.257 Presently, H&R block has 12,000 retail
offices worldwide.258 Employees of H&R Block must qualify in each
state where they operate to prepare income taxes, and training by
H&R Block meets the educational standards in each state to fulfill
the requirements for training in tax preparation.259 H&R Block is
not limited to the simplest tax returns, but charges for returns
based on complexity.260
Wills and trusts, like tax services, can be extremely
individualized and complicated, yet delivered under a corporate
structure that provides training, liability coverage, and economies
of scale that permit the reduction of the price of services.261 If
LegalZoom was permitted to hire employees to support the
completion of the documents it provides, it too could experiment
with a brick and mortar presence, and bundle easily commoditized
services such as wills and trusts. Similar to Vision Centers found
in Walmart,262 access to legal services would become visible to the
clients who need the services, and in a format that is neither
intimidating nor aloof. It might well be that legal services for
low- to moderate-income clients is less a function of price than of
product placement.263
257. See H&R BLOCK, https://www.hrblock.com/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2019)
(giving a brief history of H&R Block) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
258. Id.
259. See
Income
Tax
Course,
H&R
BLOCK,
https://www.hrblock.com/corporate/income-tax-course/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2019)
(explaining that requirements for training and certification may vary from state
to state in accordance with state law) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
260. See Tax Offices, H&R BLOCK, https://www.hrblock.com/tax-offices/ (last
visited Jan. 28, 2019) (expressing a differentiation in price based on complexity)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
261. See Denis Clifford, Making a Living Trust: Can You Do It Yourself?,
NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/making-living-trust-yourself29736.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
262. See Vision Centers, WALMART, https://www.walmart.com/cp/walmartvision-centers/1078944 (last visited Feb. 13, 2018) (describing the services and
products offered at Vision Centers) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
263. See id. (“[D]escribing how Walmart Vision Centers provide value and
“[t]he convenience you need.”).
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VI. Conclusion

The notion all legal services are the exclusive realm of lawyers
and cannot be managed by nonlawyers, is asserted at the expense
of low- to moderate-income persons.264 Model Rule 5.4 presents a
false choice: Either sacrifice the sanctity of the legal profession or
perpetuate a system that fails to provide access to those in need of
legal services.265 No other general profession deals in such
absolutist terms, nor is there any substantial reason to believe the
legal profession will denigrate into combo meals and Presidents’
Day sales.266
The way Americans consume products and services has
fundamentally shifted.267 Experiments by sliding-scale firms to
reach moderate-income clients are not changing, and will not
change, the consumer landscape.268 The legal profession should
allow corporations to tap into the large numbers of underemployed
lawyers in order to access the segment of clients who cannot afford,
or do not wish to seek out, traditional legal counsel.269 By
increasing the visibility of legal services and making those services
more approachable, low- to moderate-income clients will become
more inclined to seek attorneys at traditional law firms when
possible.270 The price of insecurities within the legal profession
should not be paid in unnecessary, adverse legal outcomes for
low- and moderate-income clientele.271

264. See supra Part IV (demonstrating the systemic exclusion of low- to
moderate-income clients from essential legal services).
265. See supra Part IV (arguing those in need of access to legal services are
deprived of such access without rational cause).
266. See id. (“[O]pponents worry that, upon modification, the practice of law
will be tainted in such a way that lawyers are no longer considered
professionals.”).
267. See Michael Stone, 10 Brand Marketing Trends to Watch in 2019, FORBES
(Jan. 28, 2019, 4:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelstone/2019
/01/28/10-brand-marketing-trends-to-watch-in-2019/#162428ac4708
(“The
blurring of online and offline retail will continue at an increased pace. Online
retailers will aggressively march into brick and mortar”) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
268. See supra Part II.D.
269. See supra notes 223–228 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 262–263 and accompanying text.
271. See Adams, supra note 6, and accompanying text.

